We provide several applications of Optimistic Mirror Descent, an online learning algorithm based on the idea of predictable sequences. First, we recover the Mirror Prox algorithm for offline optimization, prove an extension to Hölder-smooth functions, and apply the results to saddle-point type problems. Next, we prove that a version of Optimistic Mirror Descent (which has a close relation to the Exponential Weights algorithm) can be used by two strongly-uncoupled players in a finite zero-sum matrix game to converge to the minimax equilibrium at the rate of O((logT ) T ). This addresses a question of Daskalakis et al [6] . Further, we consider a partial information version of the problem. We then apply the results to convex programming and exhibit a simple algorithm for the approximate Max Flow problem.
Introduction
Recently, no-regret algorithms have received increasing attention in a variety of communities, including theoretical computer science, optimization, and game theory [3, 1] . The wide applicability of these algorithms is arguably due to the black-box regret guarantees that hold for arbitrary sequences. However, such regret guarantees can be loose if the sequence being encountered is not "worst-case". The reduction in "arbitrariness" of the sequence can arise from the particular structure of the problem at hand, and should be exploited. For instance, in some applications of online methods, the sequence comes from an additional computation done by the learner, thus being far from arbitrary.
One way to formally capture the partially benign nature of data is through a notion of predictable sequences [11] . We exhibit applications of this idea in several domains. First, we show that the Mirror Prox method [9] , designed for optimizing non-smooth structured saddle-point problems, can be viewed as an instance of the predictable sequence approach. Predictability in this case is due precisely to smoothness of the inner optimization part and the saddle-point structure of the problem. We extend the results to Hölder-smooth functions, interpolating between the case of well-predictable gradients and "unpredictable" gradients.
Second, we address the question raised in [6] about existence of "simple" algorithms that converge at the rate ofÕ(T −1 ) when employed in an uncoupled manner by players in a zero-sum finite matrix game, yet maintain the usual O(T −1 2 ) rate against arbitrary sequences. We give a positive answer and exhibit a fully adaptive algorithm that does not require the prior knowledge of whether the other player is collaborating. Here, the additional predictability comes from the fact that both players attempt to converge to the minimax value. We also tackle a partial information version of the problem where the player has only access to the real-valued payoff of the mixed actions played by the two players on each round rather than the entire vector.
Our third application is to convex programming: optimization of a linear function subject to convex constraints. This problem often arises in theoretical computer science, and we show that the idea of predictable sequences can be used here too. We provide a simple algorithm for ǫ-approximate Max Flow for a graph with d edges with time complexityÕ(d 3 2 ǫ), a performance previously obtained through a relatively involved procedure [8] .
Online Learning with Predictable Gradient Sequences
Let us describe the online convex optimization (OCO) problem and the basic algorithm studied in [4, 11] . Let F be a convex set of moves of the learner. On round t = 1, . . . , T , the learner makes a prediction f t ∈ F and observes a convex function G t on F . The objective is to keep regret
small for any f * ∈ F . Let R be a 1-strongly convex function w.r.t. some norm ⋅ on F , and let g 0 = argmin g ∈F R(g ).
Suppose that at the beginning of every round t , the learner has access to M t , a vector computable based on the past observations or side information. In this paper we study the Optimistic Mirror Descent algorithm, defined by the interleaved sequence
where D R is the Bregman Divergence with respect to R and {η t } is a sequence of step sizes that can be chosen adaptively based on the sequence observed so far. The method adheres to the OCO protocol since M t is available at the beginning of round t , and ∇G t (f t ) becomes available after the prediction f t is made. The sequence { f t } will be called primary, while {g t } -secondary. This method was proposed in [4] 
where R ≥ 0 is such that
When applying the lemma, we will often use the simple fact that
In particular, by setting ρ = η, we obtain the (unnormalized) regret bound of η
2 * by choosing η optimally. Since this choice is not known ahead of time, one may either employ the doubling trick, or choose the step size adaptively: 
Corollary 2. Consider step size
which can be recognized as the Mirror Prox method, due to Nemirovski [9] . By smoothness, ∇G(
. Lemma 1 with Eq. (3) and ρ = η = 1 H immediately yields a bound
which implies that the averagef
T , a known bound for Mirror Prox.
We now extend this result to arbitrary α-Hölder smooth functions, that is convex functions G such that
Lemma 3. Let F be a convex set in a Banach space B and let R ∶ B → R be a 
This result provides a smooth interpolation between the T −1 2 rate at α = 0 (that is, no predictability of the gradient is possible) and the T −1 rate when the smoothness structure allows for a dramatic speed up with a very simple modification of the original Mirror Descent.
Structured Optimization
In this section we consider the structured optimization problem
with φ(⋅, x) convex for every x ∈ X and φ( f , ⋅) concave for every f ∈ F . Both F and X are assumed to be convex sets. While G itself need not be smooth, it has been recognized that the structure can be exploited to improve rates of optimization if the function φ is smooth [10] . From the point of view of online learning, we will see that the optimization problem of the saddle point type can be solved by playing two online convex optimization algorithms against each other (henceforth called Players I and II). Specifically, assume that Player I produces a sequence f 1 , . . . , f T by using a regret-minimization algorithm, such that
and Player II produces x 1 , . . . , x T with
By a standard argument (see e.g. [7] ), (4) and (5), we have
which sandwiches the previous sequence of inequalities up to the sum of regret rates and implies near-optimality off T andx T . 
where R 1 and R 2 are such that
The proof of Lemma 4 is immediate from Lemma 1. We obtain the following corollary:
Hölder smooth in the following sense:
both players employ Optimistic Mirror Descent with
, where {g t } and {y t } are the secondary sequences updated by the two algorithms, and with step sizes η = η
As revealed in the proof of this corollary, the negative terms in (7), that come from an upper bound on regret of Player I, in fact contribute to cancellations with positive terms in regret of Player II, and vice versa. Such a coupling of the upper bounds on regret of the two players can be seen as leading to faster rates under the appropriate assumptions, and this idea will be exploited to a great extent in the proofs of the next section.
Zero-sum Game and Uncoupled Dynamics
The notions of a zero-sum matrix game and a minimax equilibrium are arguably the most basic and important notions of game theory. The tight connection between linear programming and minimax equilibrium suggests that there might be simple dynamics that can lead the two players of the game to eventually converge to the equilibrium value. Existence of such simple or natural dynamics is of interest in behavioral economics, where one asks whether agents can discover static solution concepts of the game iteratively and without extensive communication.
More formally, let
n×m be a matrix with bounded entries. The two players aim to find a pair of nearoptimal mixed strategies (f ,x) ∈ ∆ n × ∆ m such thatf T Ax is close to the minimax value min f ∈∆ n max x∈∆ m f T Ax, where ∆ n is the probability simplex over n actions. Of course, this is a particular form of the saddle point problem considered in the previous section, with φ( f , x) = f T Ax. It is well-known (and follows immediately from (6) ) that the players can compute near-optimal strategies by simply playing no-regret algorithms [7] . More precisely, on round t , the players I and II "predict" the mixed strategies f t and x t and observe Ax t and f T t A, respectively. While black-box regret minimization algorithms, such as Exponential Weights, immediately yield O(T −1 2 ) convergence rates, Daskalakis et al [6] asked whether faster methods exist. To make the problem well-posed, it is required that the two players are strongly uncoupled: neither A nor the number of available actions of the opponent is known to either player, no "funny bit arithmetic" is allowed, and memory storage of each player allows only for constant number of payoff vectors. The authors of [6] exhibited a near-optimal algorithm that, if used by both players, yields a pair of mixed strategies that constitutes an O log(m+n)(log T +(log(m+n)) 3 2 )
T -approximate minimax equilibrium.
Furthermore, the method has a regret bound of the same order as Exponential Weights when faced with an arbitrary sequence. The algorithm in [6] is an application of the excessive gap technique of Nesterov, and requires careful choreography and interleaving of rounds between the two non-communicating players. The authors, therefore, asked whether a simple algorithm (e.g. a modification of Exponential Weights) can in fact achieve the same result. We answer this in the affirmative. While a direct application of Mirror Prox does not yield the result (and also does not provide strong decoupling), below we show that a modification of Optimistic Mirror Descent achieves the goal.
Furthermore, by choosing the step size adaptively, the same method guarantees the typical O(T
faced with a compliant player, thus ensuring robustness. In Section 4.1, we analyze the "first-order information" version of the problem, as described above: upon playing the respective mixed strategies f t and x t on round t , Player I observes Ax t and Player II observes f T t A. Then, in Section 4.2, we consider an interesting extension to partial information, whereby the players submit their moves f t , x t but only observe the real value f T t Ax t . Recall that in both cases the matrix A is not known to the players.
First-Order Information
Consider the following simple algorithm. Initialize f 0 = g ′ 0 ∈ ∆ n and x 0 = y ′ 0 ∈ ∆ m to be uniform distributions, set β = 1 T 2 and proceed as follows:
On round t , Player I performs Play f t and observe Ax t
while simultaneously Player II performs Play x t and observe f
n is a vector of all ones and both [b] i and b(i ) refer to the i -th coordinate of a vector b. Other than the "mixing in" of the uniform distribution, the algorithm for both players is simply the Optimistic Mirror Descent with the (negative) entropy function. In fact, the step of mixing in the uniform distribution is only needed when some coordinate of g t (resp., y t ) is smaller than 1 (nT 2 ). Furthermore, this step is also not needed if none of the players deviate from the prescribed method. In such a case, the resulting algorithm is simply the constant step- 
and
respectively, then the pair 
In particular, this implies the worst-case regret of O log(nT ) √
T in the general setting of online linear optimization.
We remark that (9) can give intermediate rates for regret in the case that the second player deviates from the prescribed strategy but produces "stable" moves. For instance, if the second player employs a mirror descent algorithm (or Follow the Regularized Leader / Exponential Weights method) with step size η, one can typically show stability x t − x t −1 = O(η). In this case, (9) yields the rate O 
) which is potentially infinite for the negative entropy function R 1 . It is possible that the doubling trick or the analysis of Auer et al [2] (who encountered the same problem for the Exponential Weights algorithm) can remove the extra log T factor while still preserving the regret minimization property. We also remark that R max is small when R 1 is instead the p-norm; hence, the use of this regularizer avoids the extraneous logarithmic in T factor while still preserving the logarithmic dependence on n and m. However, projection onto the simplex under the p-norm is not as elegant as the Exponential Weights update.
Partial Information
We now turn to the partial (or, zero-th order) information model. Recall that the matrix A is not known to the players, yet we are interested in finding ǫ-optimal minimax strategies. On each round, the two players choose mixed strategies f t ∈ ∆ n and x t ∈ ∆ m , respectively, and observe f T t Ax t . Now the question is, how many such observations do we need to get to an ǫ-optimal minimax strategy? Can this be done while still ensuring the usual no-regret rate?
The specific setting we consider below requires that on each round t , the two players play four times, and that these four plays are δ-close to each other (that is, f i t − f j t 1 ≤ δ for i , j ∈ {1,... , 4}). Interestingly, up to logarithmic factors, the fast rate of the previous section is possible even in this scenario, but we do require the knowledge of the number of actions of the opposing player (or, an upper bound on this number). We leave it as an open problem the question of whether one can attain the 1 T -type rate with only one play per round.
Player I u 1 , . . ., u n−1 : orthonormal basis of ∆n
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s
let δ be small enough (e.g. exponentially small in m, n, T ), and let
β = 1 T
. If both players use above algorithms with the adaptive step sizes
and 
We leave it as an open problem to find an algorithm that attains the 1 T -type rate when both players only observe the value e T i Ae j = A i,j upon drawing pure actions i , j from their respective mixed strategies f t , x t . We hypothesize a rate better than T −1 2 is not possible in this scenario.
Approximate Smooth Convex Programming
In this section we show how one can use the structured optimization results from Section 3 for approximately solving convex programming problems. Specifically consider the optimization problem
s.t.
where G is a convex set and each G i is an H -smooth convex function. Let the optimal value of the above optimization problem be given by F * > 0, and without loss of generality assume F * is known (one typically performs binary search if it is not known). Define the sets F = { f ∶ f ∈ G,c ⊺ f = F * } and X = ∆ d . The convex programming problem in (10) can now be reformulated as
This problem is in the saddle-point form, as studied earlier in the paper. We may think of the first player as aiming to minimize the above expression over F , while the second player maximizes over a mixture of constraints with the aim of violating at least one of them. 
We then have thatf T ∈ G satisfies all d constraints and is
Lemma 8 tells us that using the predictable sequences approach for the two players, one can obtain an 
Application to Max-Flow
We now apply the above result to the problem of finding Max Flow between a source and a sink in a network, such that the capacity constraint on each edge is satisfied. For simplicity, consider a network where each edge has capacity 1 (the method can be easily extended to the case of varying capacity). Suppose the number of edges d in the network is the same order as number of vertices in the network. The Max Flow problem can be seen as an instance of a convex (linear) programming problem, and we apply the proposed algorithm for structured optimization to obtain an approximate solution.
For the Max Flow problem, the sets G and F are given by sets of linear equalities. Further, if we use Euclidean norm squared as regularizer for the flow player, then projection step can be performed in O(d) time using conjugate gradient method. This is because we are simply minimizing Euclidean norm squared subject to equality constraints which is well conditioned. Hence T 1 = O(d). Similarly, the Exponential Weights update has time complexity O(d) as there are order d constraints, and so overall time complexity to produce ǫ approximate solution is given by O(nd), where n is the number of iterations of the proposed procedure.
Once again, we shall assume that we know the value of the maximum flow F * (for, otherwise, we can use binary search to obtain it). This time complexity matches the known result from [8] , but with a much simpler procedure (gradient descent for the flow player and Exponential Weights for the constraints). It would be interesting to see whether the techniques presented here can be used to improve the dependence on d to d 4 3 or better while maintaining the 1 ǫ dependence. While the result of [5] has the improved d 4 3 dependence, the complexity in terms of ǫ is much worse.
Discussion
We close this paper with a discussion. As we showed, the notion of using extra information about the sequence is a powerful tool with applications in optimization, convex programming, game theory, to name a few. All the applications considered in this paper, however, used some notion of smoothness for constructing the predictable process M t . An interesting direction of further research is to isolate more general conditions under which the next gradient is predictable, perhaps even when the functions are not smooth in any sense. For instance one could use techniques from bundle methods to further restrict the set of possible gradients the function being optimized can have at various points in the feasible set. This could then be used to solve for the right predictable sequence to use so as to optimize the bounds. Using this notion of selecting predictable sequences one can hope to derive adaptive optimization procedures that in practice can provide rapid convergence.
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Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For any f * ∈ F ,
First observe that
Any update of the form a *
This yields
Combining, ⟨f t − f * , ∇ t ⟩ is upper bounded by
where in the last step we used strong convexity: for any f , f
Appealing to convexity of G t 's completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.
Let us re-work the proof of Lemma 1 for the case of a changing η t . Eq. (15) and (16) are now replaced by
The upper bound of Eq. (17) becomes
Summing over t = 1, . . . , T yields, for any f * ∈ F ,
Observe that
From (21),
Using this step size in Equation (20) and defining
where we used (3) with ρ = η t +1 and dropped one of the positive terms. The last two terms can be upper bounded
yielding an upper bound
In view of (21), we arrive at
). Then by Lemma 1 and by Hölder smoothness,
We can re-write the middle term in the upper bound as
by Hölder's inequality with conjugate powers 1 p = (1 − α) 2 and 1 q = (1 + α) 2. We further upper bound the last term using AM-GM inequality as
Plugging into (23),
Proof of Corollary 5. Using Lemma 4,
2 and the smoothness assumption yields
and similarly
x t − y t −1
Combining, we get the upper bound of
As in the proof of Lemma 3, we use Hölder inequality to further upper bound by
These functions are strongly convex with respect to ⋅ 1 norm on the respective flat simplex. We first upper bound regret of Player I, writing ∇ t as a generic observation vector, later to be chosen as Ax t , and M t as a generic predictable sequence, later chosen to be Ax t −1 . Observe that g
= e i * be a vertex of the simplex. Then
By the update rule,
We conclude that ⟨f t − f * , ∇ t ⟩ is upper bounded by
Using strong convexity, the term involving the four divergences can be further upper bounded by 
Using the above in the bound on ⟨f t − f * , ∇ t ⟩ and summing over t = 1, . . . , T , and using the fact that the step size are non-increasing, we conclude that
where R Using the same line of proof as the one used to arrive at Eq. (27) in Proposition 6, we get that the unnormalized regret for Player I can be upper bounded as,
